Card payment systems are sometimes accused of taking from the poor and giving to the rich. The argument is as follows: High card fees are leading to higher retail prices for both, card users and cash users. However, high-income card holders are receiving rewards when purchasing by card. The result may be a net transfer of, mostly lowincome, cash users to, mostly high-income, card users. In this article, models with product differentiation are used to show that rich card-holders may actually be paying for their card rewards themselves. In this case, there is no perverse distribution effect.
Introduction
Over the past decades, the rules that govern 4-party payment schemes have been increasingly scrutinized by anti-trust authorities. While there were a number of antitrust cases concerning card schemes in the 1980s and 1990s already, the year 2000 can be seen as turning point in the treatment of these schemes by anti-trust authorities. In this very year, the Cruickshank Commission published its report on 'Competition in UK Banking'. 1 The report came up with a long list of complaints and received a lot of attention in the UK and abroad. Subsequently, the OFT (Office of Fair Trading) officially investigated multilateral interchange fees (MIFs). In the same year, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Reserve Bank of Australia published a joint report on the Australian cards market.
2 The report initiated a In spite of the more favourable view of MIF in the academic literature, anti-trust authorities have remained highly suspicious of multi-lateral interchange fees. 8 In a large number of decisions, they ruled that MIF constitutes a restriction of competition. However, they acknowledge that 4-party systems are impractical if there is not a common price between the issuing and the acquiring side. Therefore, they have not outlawed MIF outright but resorted to price regulation.
A recent paper by SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS (2010) has provided a new twist to the debate about interchange fees. They argue that low income, cash using households are basically paying for card rewards of high-income card-holders.
"On average, ... , each low-income household pays $8 to high-income households and each high-income household receives $430 from low-income households every year." (SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS, 2010, p. 3)
The hypothesis that card payment systems are characterised by a perverse distributional effect can be found in many studies. 9 This distributional effect has been dubbed "Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy" (SEMERARO, 2009) .
The main cause of this effect is the interaction of interchange fees and reward programs. Interchange fees are flowing from the acquiring side of the market to card issuers. Issuers in turn use interchange income to finance card-holder reward programs. High interchange fees lead to high merchant fees that are passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. This mark-up usually applies to all customers, not only those paying by card (SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS, 2010, p. 1) . The main beneficiaries of these reward programs are high-income households.
As SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS (2010, p. 1) point out, this perverse distributional effect would not materialize if merchants would "recoup the merchant fee only from consumers who pay by credit card". But they argue that surcharges on card payments are often ruled out by Non Discrimination Rules (NDR) of the card companies. Furthermore, in places were surcharging is allowed, it is not used very much by merchants.
10 Therefore, they conclude that the prevalent case is one with a general markup for all customers, independent of the payment instrument used.
The estimates of SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS (2010) lend further support to recent regulatory activities such as new restrictions on debit card interchange fees in the Dodd-Frank Act or the regulatory action of the European Commission against MasterCard and Visa.
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While it is certainly true that explicit surcharging cannot be widely observed, this does not mean that merchants are unable to recover card costs from card holders. The size of the perverse distribution effect estimated by SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS (2010) crucially depends on the assumption that all groups of customers, low income and high income, card holders and non-card holders purchase a single good (or basket of goods) with a uniform price. In an updated version of the paper SCHUH, SHY and STAVINS (2011) acknowledge that the perverse distribution effect is reduced when low-income and high-income groups shop at different places. low a model of vertical product differentiation is used to show that it may be much more difficult than is commonly assumed to estimate such distributional effects and that card users may, in fact, pay a large portion of their rewards themselves. This result is based on a form of 'implicit surcharging'. If merchants practise such implicit surcharging, they may recover card costs from card users without resorting to an explicit surcharge.
Below, card acceptance is treated as an improvement in quality. Based on models of product differentiation widely used in the literature, it is shown how implicit surcharging emerges under conditions of perfect competition (section 2), monopoly (section 3) and oligopolistic competition (section 4). Section 5 provides some empirical evidence supporting the assumption that card-users and cash-users differ with respect to income. Section 6 summarizes the results and discusses the policy implications.
Vertical product differentiation: the perfect competition case
If card-users and cash-users are different, it is highly likely that they will also purchase different things. In particular, it seems probable that high-income card-users are more likely to buy expensive high-quality goods than low-income cash-users. This fact will not be lost on merchants. Indeed, product differentiation seems to be widely used by merchants. In particular, different qualities with different prices seem to be a fact of life. So, if card-holders and non-holders are buying different goods (or different qualities of the same good) it is no longer a foregone conclusion that poor cashusers are subsidising rich card-holders.
This becomes immediately obvious when we think of two different locations, one selling low quality and one selling high quality. If poor people buy in low quality stores and pay by cash they will not be affected by card fees. Card-holders shopping in high-quality shops will have to pay not just for the high price of quality but also for the costs of card acceptance. Thus, in this case, there is no cross-subsidy from cash-users to card users.
However, many retail stores or service providers (airlines, railways, theatres, etc.) cater for both groups of customers, high-income customers with a preference for high quality and low-income customers with a preference for low quality. 13 But even in such cases where both groups shop in the same store, there still may be no cross-subsidy. If there are many shops and prices are determined under conditions of perfect competition, prices will be set equal to marginal costs. If low quality (q 1 ) is paid for in cash and high quality (q 2 ) by card we get the following prices for low and high quality.
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As Tirole (1988, 96) shows, different willingness to pay for quality can be based on preferences or on income.
where p(q i ) is the price of quality i (i = 1; 2), c(q i ) is the cost of a good of quality i (i = 1; 2), c cash and c card are cash and card costs, respectively.
Thus, each type of customer pays for the costs of the particular payment instrument used. Consequently, there is no cross-subsidy. Once we allow for market power, things are more complicated, however.
3. Vertical product differentiation: the monopoly case 3.1 The standard model of product quality and market power
In this section, a standard model of vertical product differentiation will be used to address the question whether card acceptance harms low-income customers under conditions monopoly. To answer this question, card is acceptance is treated as an improvement in quality.
In the standard model of vertical product differentiation (see MUSSA and ROSEN, 1978; COOPER, 1984 , KATZ 1984 , TIROLE 1988 , a monopolist offers a certain good at different levels of quality q with q 2 [0, 1]. The fixed costs of quality are sunk and the variable costs are constant in the output level (x) but increasing in quality:
(1) Cðx; qÞ ¼ cðqÞx;
In the discrete version of the standard model, there are just two groups of customers: type 1 and type 2 -each buying a given quantity (one unit) with a choice of quality q.
Type 1: users with low willingness to pay for quality u 1 (q) Type 2: users with high willingness to pay for quality u 2 (q) 14 The utility functions of the two types are quasi-linear in a numeraire good.
where w is the numeraire good.
The utility functions for types 1 and 2 are satisfying the following conditions
In the law review literature there is some evidence supporting the assumption that prices and margins may be rising with quality. See KELMAN (1984, p. 313-318) and FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt. (2008) .
Users face a two-step decision. First, they have to decide whether to buy one unit of the product or not. Second, if they chose to purchase the product, they have to select the level of quality. If consumer surplus is positive for both quality levels, consumers select the level that provides a higher consumer surplus (self-selection constraint).
Since costs are constant in output, under competition, there would be no profits and the price of quality would be equal to the costs of quality.
Consumers would maximise utility at a point where the marginal cost (marginal price) of quality is equal to the marginal utility of quality (MUSSA and ROSEN, 1978, p. 303) . A perfectly discriminating monopolist would sell the same qualities as under competition, however, at a higher price -extracting all consumer surplus.
However, if discrimination is not feasible, the self-selection constraint comes into play. If type 2 consumers have the option to buy quality 1 at the price p(q 1 ) = u 1 (q 1 ) they will do so. Therefore, the monopolist has to lower the price of quality 2 by [u 2 (q 1 ) -u 1 (q 1 )]. Thus, in a separating equilibrium (SE) we get the following pair of prices:
In this way, a monopolist separates the two groups of customers. Type 1 customers are buying low quality and type 2 customers are buying high quality. As equation (8) shows, offering low quality in addition to high quality implies a cost in terms of lower profit margins on the sale of high quality. If the monopolist offered only q 2 he could charge p(q 2 ) = u 2 (q 2 ). However, in this case, cash-users would not be served at all. Consequently, the whole problem of a cross-subsidy could not arise. Therefore, only the SE will be analysed, below.
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In the SE, profits are given by (9):
where n 1 (n 2 ) is the number of type 1 (type 2) customers. The monopolist offers q 1 at a price that extracts all consumer surplus of type 1 customers and q 2 at the incentive compatible price. Do the Poor Pay for Card Rewards of the Rich? Á 135
A 'pooling strategy', i. e. one quality offered at a uniform price for both types of customers, would be another option. ACHARYYA (1998) claims that in certain cases a pooling equilibrium may yield higher profits than either a separating or high quality equilibrium. It can be shown, however, that if there is no upper limit for quality the monopolist always prefers a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium (see appendix 2).
Conditions for a profit maximum are
Equation (10) implies that the profit maximising quality offered to type 2 customers in a separating equilibrium is equal to the optimal level of quality.
where an asterisk denotes the efficient level of quality.
The quality q 1 offered to type 1 customers is inefficiently low, however. According to (11) profit maximisation implies that for low quality marginal utility has to be higher than marginal costs. This can be achieved by lowering the level of quality below the efficient level.
The resulting prices and qualities are depicted in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Quality levels and prices in the separating and the high-price equilibrium u 1 , u 2 : utility of type 1 and type 2 consumers, u 2 ðq Ã 2 Þ: utility of type 2 when purchasing high quality, p 1 (p 2 ): profit maximising price for low (high) quality, q 1 : profit maximising value of low quality, q 2 * : profit maximising and efficient level of high quality; α u 2 ðq 1 Þ À u 1 ðq 1 Þ;
A result derived already in MUSSA and ROSEN (1978) .
The economic intuition underlying this result is described nicely in a quote from Dupuit who discusses the quality distortion in the context of railway pricing:
"It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches… What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third-class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich… And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and mean to second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous." (Dupuit 1962 (Dupuit /1849 .
Card acceptance under the NDR
If a merchant with market power introduces card acceptance, some customers will continue paying with cash whereas others will be paying by card. Empirical research on payments shows that card users have higher income, on average, and that the average card transaction has a higher value than the average cash transaction. 17 Thus, it seems plausible that users of cards will be mostly type 2 customers and users of cash will be type 1 customers.
For type 2 customers cards provide a certain benefit. Thus, the utility of buying a good of a certain quality is higher when paying with cards then when paying with cash. The utility when paying with cards is denoted as u c . The card benefit is equal to b c . In addition, it is assumed that the card benefit is a positive function of q. This assumption can be rationalised with the observation that the utility of card usage is likely to rise with prices and that the price of a good usually is a positive function of its quality.
For type 1 customers, cards do not provide any (net) benefit. Consequently, type 2 customers will prefer, ceteris paribus, to pay by card whereas type 1 customers will use cash as means of payment. If a merchant starts to accept card payments the utility of type 2 customers is increased for any q.
Finally, it is assumed that card usage has a stronger effect on marginal card benefits of card-holders than on marginal card costs of merchants. To justify this assumption, it can be pointed out that it would not be profitable for merchants to accept card payments if marginal costs (net of any card benefit for merchants) were higher than marginal utility. Proposition 1: Card acceptance increases the quality offered to type 2 customers and lowers the quality offered to type 1 customers. Correspondingly, the price paid by type 1 customers falls and the price paid by type 2 customers rises. Proof: For type 2 customers, the profit maximising condition becomes
where the superscript 'C' indicates a separating equilibrium with card acceptance. Given the assumption that marginal card benefit rises faster than marginal card costs (16), card acceptance induces merchants to raise quality in order to equate marginal costs and marginal utility. Thus we get (18) q C 2 > q 2 Profits are given by:
Þg The profit maximising condition for low quality becomes:
Re-arranging yields:
According to (14), at the optimal quality level q 1 (the optimal q 1 before card acceptance), card acceptance raises marginal utility of type 2 users. Consequently, the right-hand side of equation (21) must be larger than the left-hand side. To restore equilibrium of both sides of the equation, quality has to be lowered (raising the left-
This assumption is in line with the results of ROCHET and TIROLE (2011) and WRIGHT (2010) . Under various assumptions regarding the nature of competition they find that merchants will accept cards only if the sum of merchant benefits and net card-holder benefits is larger than merchant costs. hand side and lowering the right-hand side). Consequently, card acceptance lowers the optimal value of q 1 (see Figure 2) . Q.E.D.
Thus, it can be concluded that card-acceptance increases the deviation from the optimal level of quality.
where an asterisk denotes values under perfect competition. Card acceptance shifts the two quality levels further apart. The level of quality offered to type 1 customers falls. Therefore, card acceptance does not raise prices for them -rather it lowers them. For type 2 customers, card acceptance increases quality and price. Do the Poor Pay for Card Rewards of the Rich? Á 139
In appendix 1, qualities and prices are derived for logarithmic utility functions and power cost functions.
The new price posted for high quality goods purchased by card-holders (type 2 customers) is:
If the quantity demanded is inelastic, cash-users do not subsidise cardusers. Proof: In a SE, before and after card acceptance, merchants extract all surplus from type 1 customers. Thus, net utility (u(q 1 ) -p 1 ) remains constant. Since the quality q 1 is lowered after card acceptance, the price of q 1 falls. Thus, card-acceptance neither leads to higher prices for cash-users nor to lower consumer surplus. Q.E.D.
The fall of quality q 1 goes hand-in-hand with a lower profit margin. Since q 1 lies left of q Ã 1 marginal utility is higher than marginal costs ½@u 1 ðq 1 Þ=@q 1 > @cðq 1 Þ=@q 1 . Therefore, any movement further to the left (towards q C 1 ) reduces the margin earned on low quality ½u 1 ðq 1 Þ À cðq 1 Þ.
Type 2 customers are paying a higher price after the introduction of card acceptance. The price increase is due to -increased utility due to card usage -higher quality q 2 -lower quality q 1
The resulting price increase could be larger or smaller than the costs of card acceptance. However, as has been shown above, the margin on sales to type 1 customers falls. Merchants will be willing to introduce card acceptance only if it does not lead to lower profits. Therefore, prices on high quality have to rise by more than the costs of cards. Otherwise, merchants will not accept cards.
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Card acceptance will increase profits for a merchant if the following condition is met:
Þ If this condition is not fulfilled, merchant profits will be higher without card acceptance. Thus, if cards are accepted, the costs of card acceptance -including costs of reward program -are carried by card users.
Á Malte Krüger -------------
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As shown by Rochet and TIROLE (2011) and Wright (2010) . See footnote 19. : cost of quality without (with) card acceptance; p 1 (p 2 ): price of low (high) quality, q 1 (q 2 ): level of low (high) quality; superscript 'C': equilibrium with card acceptance;β u 1 ðq 1 Þ À cðq 1 Þ;
To sum up, in the standard model of vertical product differentiation with a monopolist supplier, there is no perverse distribution effect. As long as rich card-holders are buying higher qualities than poor cash users, they are paying themselves for their rewards.
An oligopolistic model of product differentiation
When considering competition between retailers, the case with differentiated retailers catering for different groups is not very interesting. In such a case, obviously, there will be no distribution effect from poor cash-users to wealthy card-holders. The interesting question is whether such a distributional effect could arise in the case of oligopolistic competition between retailers that try to serve both groups of customers. To analyse this question, the model of KATZ (1984) with horizontal and vertical product differentiation will be used. 21 KATZ (1984) considers two firms producing both high and low quality of a given good. Each firm chooses a level of a brand attribute. 22 The brand attribute is treated as a horizontal attribute. It is firm-specific -not quality-specific -and distinguishes the two firms in the eyes of potential customers. There are no economies of scope Do the Poor Pay for Card Rewards of the Rich? Á 141
The 1984 KATZ model is also discussed by MANEZ and WATERSON (2001) .
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This could also be a technical attribute such as electrical versus gas stove. and the production of each quality level is characterized by constant unit costs. Restricting the model to two qualities (high and low) profits per firm j are
There is a limited number of income-groups which can be conveniently restricted to two groups. One high-income group with a high willingness to pay for high quality and one low-income group with a lower willingness to pay for quality. 23 The distribution of brand preferences is the same in both groups. Thus, there is not a particular brand preferred by high-income customers and one preferred by low-income customers. Consumers are choosing the product that maximises the following indirect utility function
where V ijk is the utility of customer k when purchasing quality i from company j. m is the basic willingness to pay for the product and v denotes the sensitivity with respect to differences in quality. ρ is the premium a consumer is willing to pay for brand j. If V is positive, customers are buying one unit, if it is negative for all products they are purchasing nothing.
Competition between the two horizontally differentiated firms is modelled along the lines of HOTELLING (1929) . The willingness to pay of a particular consumer depends on the difference between the brand offered in the market and the "ideal" brand. "z" measures the sensitivity with respect to this difference. It corresponds to transportation costs parameters in the original Hotelling model.
preferred brands f are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] (for both types of consumers) The basic willingness to pay m is assumed to be equal for all consumers. However, v differs for the two income groups with v 2 > v 1 and z 2 > z 1 .
In order to solve the model, KATZ (1984) makes the simplifying assumption that firms can somehow rule of the intra-firm competition between different qualities (thus there is no self-selection constraint across quality variants). As a consequence, competition takes place in two separated sub-markets -one for high quality and one for low quality. In both sub-markets the efficient level of quality is supplied.
If the two firms follow a strategy of maximum differentiation with b 1 = 0 and b 2 = 1, a consumer characterised by (v k , z, f) derives a benefit of m þ v k ðq i1 Þ À zf when purchasing a product of firm 1 and m þ v k ðq i2 Þ À zð1 À f Þ when purchasing a product of firm 2. Thus, a consumer is willing to pay a premium of up to zð1 À 2f Þ to con-sume a product of firm 1 rather than firm 2. 24 Consequently, the condition for purchasing a product of firm 1 is
If the number of consumers is normalised to 1, f is the demand for products of firm 1 and (1-f) is the demand for products of firm 2. Profits of firm 1 and 2 are given by
Assuming identical costs for both firms and identical z's for customers, a symmetric equilibrium can be derived with
If both firms were to introduce card acceptance, for both of them costs would be rising whenever customers are paying by card. If type 2 customers use cards to pay for high quality in both shops (of firm 1 and 2), the costs of high quality will be increased whereas the cost of low quality will not be affected. As a result, according to (32), the price of high quality should be raised by the (additional) costs of card acceptance whereas the price of low quality should remain constant (33).
Thus, in this case, as well, the extra costs of card acceptance will be borne by cardusers.
Card users and cash users: Summary of the evidence
The results derived in this paper strongly depend on the assumption that merchants can separate card users and non-users. There is little hard evidence to support this point. However, some empirical evidence exists, showing that card-holders and nonholders differ and that the average value of card transactions is higher than the average value of cash transactions.
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For f > 0,5 this term becomes negative, implying a willingness to pay a premium for products of firm 2.
Data of the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (reported in SCHUH, Oz and STA- VINS, 2010, p. 8) show that in the US, card ownerships and card spending are rising with income (see Table 1 ). Only 42% of households with an annual income under $20,000 owned a credit card. For households with an income of more than $100,000 market coverage was almost complete (96%). As Table 3 shows, low-income households are predominantly cash users. When looking at the number of transactions, the data show that cash is still the dominant means of payment for low and high-income households. However, low-income households use cards for only 14% (8/58s) of their transactions whereas high-income households use cards for 31% (13/42s) of their transactions. In Germany, credit cards are not as ubiquitous as in the United States. Most credit cards cost a fee (with an average fee of about 20 EUR) and issuers are requiring a minimum credit standing of new customers. Since almost everyone has a giro (checkable) account which comes with a (usually free) debit card, there is also less demand for credit cards. As a consequence, in a population of 80 million inhabitants, there are only about 20 million credit card holders and the average credit card holder has a higher income than the average non-card holder. Source: Krueger, Leibold and Smasal (2008) . Table 4 provides empirical evidence from a German internet survey conducted in 2008. Participants were asked whether they owned a credit card and what their income was. As the results show, the average income of the holder of a credit card is more than twice as high as the income of respondents not holding a credit card. A similar picture emerges from the results of a household survey published by the Deutsche Bundesbank in 2009. The survey shows that only 27% of respondents own a credit card and that only 8% used a credit card at least once during the last 7 days (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, p. 42-3) . The survey also shows, that the educational level of card holders is above average and that card ownership strongly rises with household income (see Table 5 ). The survey of the Bundesbank also shows that cards are usually used for highvalue transactions whereas cash is predominantly used for small transactions. Within the group of card payments, credit card transactions exhibit a higher average value than debit card transactions. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2012, p. 48) .
The data presented suggest that card-holders are indeed different and that merchants may use product differentiation in order to extract consumer surplus from card holders. To formally test the proposition of this paper, better data would be required; for instance, data on the average margin earned from sales to card holders as compared to the average margin on sales to non-card holders.
Conclusion
If merchants engage in product differentiation and apply different margins to different levels of quality, the "Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy-Effect" may not be effective. If card-users predominantly buy high quality goods and cash-users low quality goods, card holders end up paying their own rewards.
25 This is an important finding for policy makers because one of the main arguments in favour of the regulation of interchange fees has been the hypothesis that high card fees drive up merchants' costs and that these costs are passed on to all customers, card-users and cash-users. For instance, the European Commission sums up the case against high interchange fees as follows:
"The lack of transparency on the merchant side and the low degree of elasticity of merchant demand implies that payment networks can impose significant MIFs without facing substantially lower demand from retailers, as both the ability to surcharge and the ability to reject card payments are limited. Due to this lack of mer-
Others have criticised the Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy hypothesis on the grounds that merchant benefits of card acceptance may be larger than the costs of cards acceptance (SEMERARO, 2009). chant resistance, MIFs have the potential of significantly increasing merchants' costs of payment cards. This leads to increases in retail prices for all consumers, including those that do not use payment cards. Every card payment then imposes an invisible tax on others (the merchant and its customers) compared with non-card payments, which would most often be in cash." (European Commission 2015, 14) Indeed, there seems to be some empirical evidence suggesting that merchants often do not implement surcharging even if it is allowed (IMA, 2000; ITM, 2000) . 26 However, as has been shown above, the lack of explicit surcharging may also be explained by merchants' use of implicit surcharging. Therefore, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that cash-users are hurt by high card fees and have to be protected by regulators.
To put it differently: If we accept the EU Commission's argument that interchange fees are a kind of tax, it is by no means clear who carries the ultimate economic burden -merchants, the average consumer, particular consumer groups (card-users, cash-users), … Under various assumptions regarding merchant market power and under the assumption of a fixed (inelastic) demand card-users have to carry the burden. With elastic demand this may be different. In a model without product differentiation, Schwartz and Vincent (2006) find that with elastic demand, cash payers may have to carry some of the costs of card acceptance. Whether such a result would also be true when product differentiation is used, is a topic for future research.
The results of the model presented in this paper are also important with respect to the welfare effects of surcharging. It has been shown (Wright, 2003) that surcharging may be inefficient if merchants have market power. Therefore, a case can be made for NDRs. However, the results above suggest that merchants with market power may be able to use implicit surcharging. Thus, the existence or non-existence of NDRs may not matter much for them.
Overall, the results provide a cautionary tale for regulators. While it cannot be ruled out that cash-users are, to some extent, paying for the high costs of card acceptance, it seems clear that the size of this effect is limited by merchants' abilities to use price discrimination and implicitly charge card-users.
For n 1 = n 2 we get
Thus we get the following optimality condition
The optimal quality q 1 in a SE without card acceptance
In the SE the condition for the optimal quality q 2 is:
The optimal quality q 2 in a SE without card acceptance
The optimal price p 1 in a SE without card acceptance
The optimal price p 2 in a SE without card acceptance In the SE the condition for the optimal quality q 1 is:
The optimal quality q 1 in a SE with card acceptance
The optimal quality q 2 in a SE with card acceptance
The optimal price p 1 in a SE with card acceptance Given the assumptions about costs and utility, at q p marginal utility of type 2 customers is higher than marginal costs. Therefore, the change in utility is larger than the change in costs and thus π S* is larger than π P . Moreover, the monopolist could further raise profits by lowering the quality of goods offered to type 1 customers and charging higher prices to type 2 customers.
